Obstruction of Justice: Harris County Courts and Hon. Dan Hinde’s Farcical Order

Total
0
Shares

Y’ALL CANNOT HAVE A JUDGE ACTING FOR DEFENDANTS

Originally Published:  Jun. 23, 2023 | Republished: Jun. 23, 2023

MARK BURKE (“PLAINTIFF”):  NOTICE

Reservation of Rights and Statement by Mark Burke Asserting this Severed Civil Action is Void for Want of Jurisdiction

To begin, it is important to document on the record that the severance order issued in this new civil action is void for want of jurisdiction and as such lacks authority or power to hear and decide this severed case. See;

Jones v. Bartlett, 189 S.W. 1107, 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (“”It is a plain and undeniable principle that, to give any binding effect to the proceedings of a court, it must have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and of the cause or subject-matter. The want of jurisdiction makes the judgment utterly void and unavailable for any purpose.””).

Therefore, the use of the naming convention “Plaintiff” should be understood loosely. Mark Burke, acting as the “Plaintiff” in this civil case, unequivocally disavows any proceedings and orders in this matter.

Any responses and filings by Mark Burke should not be construed as a waiver of his objection to this case. It is crucial to note that Plaintiff’s submissions to the court do not imply personal nor subject-matter jurisdiction and should not be interpreted as a waiver of his objection.

Judicial Notice

In order to avoid false accusations of non-participation in the proceedings and the potential risk of being held in contempt of court or facing similar consequences, Plaintiff invokes the court’s allowance to take judicial notice of its own files, and now provides his concerns in writing to add to those files in advance of any hearing(s). See;

In re K.F., 402 S.W.3d 497, 505 (Tex. App. 2013) (“A trial court may take judicial notice of the records in its own court filed in the same case, with or without the request of a party.”).

Facts

Moving on to the procedural posturing in this case, it is highly alarming.  The court itself severed the case, relying on Section 30.017.   Hon. Dan Hinde subsequently issued an Order to Show Cause, scheduling the hearing for Monday, June 19, 2023. However, due to the court’s closure for Juneteenth Day, an amended Order to Show Cause has been set for Friday, June 30, 2023.

The Order references Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 30.017(c), which states:

“The presiding judge of the administrative region or the presiding judge of the statutory probate courts shall assign the severed claim to a different judge. The judge shall dismiss the claim if the claim does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection (a)(1) or (2).”

Subsection (a)(1) is satisfied as the submission is made under oath, as evidenced by 202268307A – BURKE, MARK vs. REEDER, LAUREN HONORABLE THE (Court 234), Plaintiff & Counter-Defendant’s Second Amended Petition, dated 4/17/2023, image no. 108169168:

“RESPECTFULLY submitted this 17th day of April, 2023. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code. – [signed] Mark Burke, State of Texas / Pro Se”.

Subsection (a)(2) is satisfied as both judges (“Defendants”) acted and are still acting without jurisdiction in the original complaint, as witnessed in 202268307 – BURKE, MARK vs. KPH-CONSOLIDATION INC (DBA HCA HOUSTON HEALTHCARE KINGWOOD) (Court 234).

For instance, as recently as June 13, 2023, Judge Lauren Reeder issued an ORDER SIGNED DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS while lacking jurisdiction over the case due to the fiasco caused by both Defendants after Plaintiff submitted “Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder and Verified Declaration,” docketed on March 17, 2023, in the original case and which was incorrectly treated as a recusal motion, leading to a series of missteps by the court, during which jurisdiction was lost and never regained. Despite these facts, the court has persisted with its void orders and judgments.

Alas, the court’s mishandling of the case has not ceased, as witnessed again by this suit. There are significant issues related to this Show Cause Order and Hearing.

This is a new case with a new civil action and cause number. Despite this, the docket does not indicate that the Defendants, namely Judges Reeder and Brown, will be attending, nor are they currently represented by counsel.

Plaintiff has thoroughly reviewed the retooled new case docket, and as of the time of writing, no counsel for Defendants has appeared. Consequently, Plaintiff is unable to communicate with Defendants through appointed counsel. Therefore, Plaintiff is left with no choice but; (i) to express concerns directly to the assigned Judge, and; (ii) to attend a one-sided hearing before the same Judge who intends to make a swift determination.

This would violate the protections put in place to ensure a fair tribunal and hearing for Plaintiff. Under normal circumstances, this scenario would infringe upon the absent parties’ rights, similar to the ‘Ex Parte’ hearing Judge Reeder held in January 2023, and which does not benefit from judicial immunity.

However, this is not a normal circumstance, and as the ‘Defendants’ are fellow judges and colleagues, they may be extremely willing to trust in the Hon. Dan Hinde to represent them, present their case and raise legal objections.

Despite this, Mark Burke objects to another hearing which carries the potential for an appearance of impropriety – and having no Defendants or counsel goes far beyond any imagined scenario.  See;

State of Texas v. Perkins, 143 Tex. 386, 391 (Tex. 1945) (“If plaintiff had duly appeared on the day fixed by the fiat for appearance of the defendants, and defendants had not appeared on that date in response to the show-cause notice, the trial court could not rightly have granted plaintiff a judgment upon plaintiff’s ex parte hearing decreeing that the hotel be closed and padlocked and that the defendants be permanently enjoined as prayed. For the court to have taken such action was within his power, but would have been an erroneous use of such power. Such action by the court would have been no more arbitrary, however, than his action in the present ex parte dismissal of plaintiff’s case.”).

It is recognized the facts in the cited case pertains to a TRO hearing and does not rely upon Section 30.017’s allowance to dismiss  the claim. That said, the fact remains that this is a new civil action, a trial case which is proceeding in an untenable format.  See;

State of Texas v. Perkins, 143 Tex. 386, 391 (Tex. 1945) (“It had not been placed upon a trial calendar or set for trial on the merits and had been pending less than a month. Two of the defendants had not been served, either with show-cause notices, or regular citation.”).

In short, all Defendants and/or their counsel should be available for Plaintiff to communicate and examine. Failure of this natural right is, at minimum, a due process violation. However, due to the aforementioned restrictions, Plaintiff is unable to confer with Defendants, as the court is acting as a  judicial gatekeeper.

Plaintiff assumes that there is no need to provide specific reasoning as to why this presents a major due process and constitutional issue. If ordered, Plaintiff can provide a brief on these issues.

Relief

In summary, Mark Burke seeks a determination from the court on the issues raised in advance of any planned hearing(s).  Plaintiff reserves the right to request a hearing on any determination this court provides.

Conclusion

Until that time, Plaintiff respectfully notifies the court that he will not be attending any scheduled hearing(s) that violate his rights to a fair tribunal and hearing.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 23rd day of June, 2023.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE “ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION…”

The order cannot be dismissed with prejudice, it has to be without prejudice, if at all, and only after proper notice. Here, the court’s notice was pertaining to a “Show Cause” hearing relying upon the severing of the case by the court itself, and Sec. 30.017.

This was premature.

A hearing cannot be held if the court suggests that process of service was required. A court lacks jurisdiction to hold such a hearing without all parties present. In the alternative, the court should have provided notice of an intended Dismissal for Want of Prosecution (DWOP) in order to allow Plaintiff time to effect service.

The court did not do so, and as such lacks jurisdiction to enter the final order it did, per the docket entry which clearly reads “DISMISSED ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION”. It begs the question, where is the defendant’s motion? There is none on the docket and Plaintiff has never seen or received one – as they have not appeared, as admitted by the court in its order.

The court explained, “When a purported affidavit lacks a jurat and a litigant fails to provide extrinsic evidence to show that it was sworn to before an authorized officer, the opposing party must object to this error, thereby giving the litigant a chance to correct the error.”  (acknowledging and disapproving of court of appeals opinions holding that the absence of a jurat is a substantive defect).

ACI Design Build Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App. 2020)

Although the court considered the distinction between form and substance in the context of an affidavit rather than an unsworn declaration, its prudential considerations for requiring error preservation apply equally to unsworn declarations.

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 132.001(a) (stating that generally “an unsworn declaration may be used in lieu of a written sworn declaration, verification, certification, oath, or affidavit”).

Accordingly, we conclude that ACI has likewise waived its complaint that Loadholt’s declaration lacked a jurat. We overrule ACI’s first issue.”

ACI Design Build Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App. 2020)

A CHERRY-PICKED ‘SCOURING’ BY THE COURT BLANKS THE TRUTH AND REAL FACTS

The order refers to the Second Amended Petition and claims Plaintiff did not state the county. That is false. He provided the last 3 no.’s of his DL and SS ID’s and stated Harris County.

Furthermore, it is not for the courts to object, it is the defendants, as verified by the cases cited below.

The court is incorrect in law when it states Plaintiff did not substantially comply with the requirements of the 132.001(d), despite any citations to case law supporting this assertion. Plaintiff counters and rejects such an assertion, see; McMahan v. Izen, No. 01-20-00233-CV (Tex. App. Sep. 2, 2021).

The court explained, “When a purported affidavit lacks a jurat and a litigant fails to provide extrinsic evidence to show that it was sworn to before an authorized officer, the opposing party must object to this error, thereby giving the litigant a chance to correct the error.”  (acknowledging and disapproving of court of appeals opinions holding that the absence of a jurat is a substantive defect).

ACI Design Build Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App. 2020)

Although the court considered the distinction between form and substance in the context of an affidavit rather than an unsworn declaration, its prudential considerations for requiring error preservation apply equally to unsworn declarations.

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 132.001(a) (stating that generally “an unsworn declaration may be used in lieu of a written sworn declaration, verification, certification, oath, or affidavit”).

Accordingly, we conclude that ACI has likewise waived its complaint that Loadholt’s declaration lacked a jurat. We overrule ACI’s first issue.”

ACI Design Build Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App. 2020)

OOPS, CANNOT HAVE A SHOW CAUSE ON FREEDOM DAY, JUNETEENTH

Originally Published:  May. 30, 2023 | Republished: Jun. 18, 2023

202268307A – BURKE, MARK vs. REEDER, LAUREN HONORABLE THE (Court 234)

Originally Published:  Apr. 20, 2023 | Republished: Jun. 18, 2023

Current with legislation from the 2023 Regular Session effective as of June 2, 2023.

Section 30.017 – Claims Against Certain Judges

(a) A claim against a district court, statutory probate court, or statutory county court judge that is added to a case pending in the court to which the judge was elected or appointed:(1) must be made under oath;

(2) may not be based solely on the rulings in the pending case but must plead specific facts supporting each element of the claim in addition to the rulings in the pending case;

and

(3) is automatically severed from the case.

(b) The clerk of the court shall assign the claim a new cause number, and the party making the claim shall pay the filing fees.

(c) The presiding judge of the administrative region or the presiding judge of the statutory probate courts shall assign the severed claim to a different judge.

The judge shall dismiss the claim if the claim does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection (a)(1) or (2).

Tex. Civ. Prac. and Rem. Code § 30.017
Added by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 608, Sec. 1, eff. 9/1/1999.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You May Also Like