Blackballed by the Black Robes: Responding to Assigned Judge Dan Hinde’s Absurd Order

Despite the fact this severed case in the County of Harris District Court is a nullity and the Order void as previously advised and acknowledged by the court, Plaintiff submits this motion to allow either Assigned Judge Dan Hinde or another Assigned Judge, should he correctly volunteer to [self] recuse, the opportunity to reconsider his bad faith legal error and to prevent a manifest injustice. “Legal error constitutes misconduct when “a legal ruling or action [is] made contrary to clear and determined law about which there is no confusion or question as to its interpretation and where the complained-of legal error is egregious, made as part of a pattern or practice of legal error, or made in bad faith” In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. 1999).

The Civil Action Commences

On October 18, 2022, Mark Burke sued HCA Healthcare Kingwood, and Harris County District Court assigned Case No. 2022-68307 to Court 234, Judge Lauren Reeder presiding.

The Civil Action is Halted

Litigation proceeded until Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Reeder and Verified Declaration in support, which was filed on March 17, 2023.

However, in the judicial acts which follow, the judiciary refused to acknowledge or accept Plaintiff’s arguments that he filed a Motion to Disqualify, rather they responded by issuing void Orders and assignments, erroneously treating it as a Motion to Recuse Judge Reeder, clearly violating Plaintiff’s civil and constitutional rights, including due process. See; Barnes v. Lancashire (In re B.M.B.), No. 05-22-01322-CV, at *17 (Tex. App. June 6, 2023);

“We interpret our rules of civil procedure using the same principles we apply when construing statutes…Our review is de novo, and our primary objective is to give effect to the drafter’s intent as expressed in the rule’s language…We look first to the rule’s language and construe it according to its plain meaning.”

It is without doubt Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a and Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b distinguish many times between “Recusal” and “Disqualification” of Judges. The plain meaning by separating those two words is clear and obvious, as different rules and principles apply.

See; Fuelberg v. State, 410 S.W.3d 498, 510 (Tex. App. 2013);

“we conclude that Judge Richardson abused his discretion by applying the incorrect legal standard to Fuelberg’s motion to recuse. See State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901, 907 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (noting that trial court abuses discretion when misapplies the law).”.

However, Judge Reeder’s Order clearly states on the docket; ORDER SIGNED DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE and the Order itself headlines with; ORDER ON MOTION TO RECUSE AND TO REFER TO PRESIDING JUDGE instead of correctly addressing Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify. Judge Reeder’s Order and the judicial referrals, assignments, hearings, Orders and acts thereafter are void ab initio.

Judicial Misconduct Leads to Improper Judicial Severance

The Motion to Disqualify Judge Reeder was filed after an accumulation of improper, unethical, and unconstitutional rulings by Judge Reeder along with other concerns discovered and discussed by Plaintiff, and which violate due process.

The very first scheduled hearing between the parties, scheduled for Jan. 9, 2023, started the slide from a case focusing on an “imposter” Doctor at HCA Healthcare’s Kingwood Hospital stalking Mark Burke, to the legal profession, including Harris County Court employees and those associated with, or which became a part of Mark Burke’s civil action before Court No. 234.

The Ex Parte Hearing Between Judge Reeder and Serpe Andrews, PLLC, Lawyers for Defendants HCA Healthcare (Jan. 9, 2023)

A key part of the Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify  Judge Reeder concerned;

“(h) Holding the January 9, 2023 in-person hearing, and then continuing after the court reporter ceased recording – which is determined in law as ex parte communications with opposing counsel without me present – and then preventing me from examining the court reporter by quashing the subpoena, including her attendance and for other reasons as provided in my response to the motion to quash and for protective order”

Ex parte communications do not receive judicial immunity as detailed in the “Arguments and Authorities – Constitutional Grounds for Disqualification” section of the motion.

Case Law in Support of Legal Definition of Ex Parte (2022)

In support of the legal definition of “ex parte“, Creekside Rural Investments v. Hicks, 644 S.W.3d 896 (Tex. App. 2022), provides a pertinent case. Judge Dan Hicks, upon receiving an email with a letter directly addressed to him from a lawyer representing the parties involved, deemed it as an ex parte communication. Consequently, he promptly recused himself and reassigned the matter to Judge Ernie Armstrong. These details are extracted from the appellate court docket containing the emails.

Despite numerous conflicts, donations from Serpe Andrews, and her direct interference in an investigation concerning her own ex parte actions, Judge Lauren Reeder stubbornly presented herself as being ‘above the law’.

See; Reed v. State, 794 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. App. 1990);

“No individual, whether he be citizen, lawyer, or judge, is above the law. We must abide by and follow the law as it is and not as we wish it were.”.

And in conjunction with; “HCA Healthcare Inc. and HCA Lawyers Court Behavior and Judicial Donations Under the Microscope” – KingwoodDr.com; “First Amended Motion for Sanctions, to Disqualify Serpe Andrews PLLC, Nicole G. Andrewsm [sic] and Madison J. Addicks and Order Release of Video Surveillance Footage to Plaintiff”, docketed Dec. 27, 2023 in main case.

This was evident in her decision to remain on the case, issue Orders, and ultimately force Mark Burke to file a Motion to Disqualify. The aftermath thereafter resulted in this severed civil action.

Next, let’s refresh the other issues with proceedings which switched this case from a dispute with a Hospital to a lawsuit against the legal profession and judiciary in Texas by revisiting the true facts in the main proceeding and which ultimately led to the improper severance and Order by the Assigned Judge Dan Hinde.

Serpe Andrews Associate Attorney Benjamin “Ben” Hamel Appears as Lead Counsel for Partner Nicole Andrews, Without Notice and Without Authority

In this case, attorney Benjamin Hamel unexpectedly appeared as lead counsel for partner Nicole Andrews without giving prior notice or having the necessary authority. At the conclusion of the court reporter Norma Thieme’s transcript of the hearing, she alluded to confirm to Mark Burke in an email thread that Hamel engaged in ex parte communications with the judge, without the presence of the Plaintiff, and was accompanied by newly hired associate Madison Addicks. The Plaintiff contends the trial judge’s interactions with Hamel indicate a lack of impartiality and more importantly, this behavior mandates immediate disqualification of the trial judge.

Furthermore, despite being Counter-Plaintiffs and named Defendants in the Second Amended Petition, Serpe Andrews, PLLC, and its attorneys are representing HCA Healthcare Kingwood, despite their status as adverse witnesses and now parties. As documented on the record, Plaintiff has raised many objections and filed formal pleadings opposing their continued involvement in the main civil action, as far as representation of Defendants or parties other than themselves.

Serpe Andrews Associate Attorney Madison Addicks Parents are Both Texas Lawyers

Serpe Andrews Associate Attorney Madison Addicks comes from a family deeply rooted in the legal profession. Both of her parents are active State Bar registered attorneys. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that despite their legal background, neither of Addicks’ parents appeared as witnesses during the Jan. 9, 2023 hearing which sought injunctive relief against Mark Burke based on their false allegations of [criminal] stalking and harassment.

The transcript confirmed it turned out to be a ‘no evidence, no witness’ hearing. There was a complete absence of independent evidence or witnesses to corroborate the Defendant’s and Counter-Plaintiff’s unfounded and vengeful accusations made in their baseless counterclaim.

This absence of support not only casts serious doubts on the credibility of the Defendants but also serves to affirm the Plaintiff’s contentions made in his Motion for Sanctions as undeniably true. The Defendant’s baseless and malicious claims stand exposed, further highlighting their lack of integrity and the urgent need for appropriate consequences.

Serpe Andrews, Lawyers and Family Members Provide Significant Financial Backing to Judge Reeder’s Reelection Campaign

In what was a major development, Plaintiff discovered Serpe Andrews and their  lawyers, along with their family members, played a substantial role in providing generous financial contributions to support Judge Reeder during her 2022 reelection campaign. The magnitude of the financial support underscores the deep financial ties between Serpe Andrews legal team and Judge Reeder. However, what is of utmost concern, is she was the only sitting Harris County District Court Judge to benefit from such generosity from opposing counsel, a law firm which practice focuses on defense of medical negligence and related civil actions.

This revelation raises important questions about the influence, bias, and impartiality which impacts ongoing proceedings. The notable level of financial backing from the law firm and its associated family members called for a thorough examination of any potential conflicts of interest and their potential ramifications on the fairness and integrity of the legal process.

Alas, a full investigation, examining witnesses including the Court Reporter, opposing counsel and Addicks parents has been curtailed due to the acts of Judge Reeder in advance of the Mar. 20, 2023 Sanctions hearing, as presented in Plaintiffs past pleadings, and again here.

Familiar Obstacles Persist: HCA Hospital and Harris County Court Withholding Video Surveillance Footage from Plaintiff in Violation of the Law

Mark Burke has encountered significant obstacles within the Harris County Courts and the Courts Administration Departments, as evidenced in an incident where he made an Open Records request (PIA) to obtain video surveillance footage for the Harris Court Building which houses Court 234.

See; “Public Information Act Request from Harris County District Court (PIA)” – KingwoodDr.com;  and, most recently a disconcerting letter dated Wednesday, July 5, 2023, in direct response to Mark Burke’s request for retraction from Richards Woods, Harris County Court Administrator and affirming “I work for the judiciary – I am the administrator of the district courts.”.

Unfortunately, as indicated above, Mark Burke’s standard online PIA request was crudely intercepted and redirected to Richard Woods, District Court Administrator, his attorneys, and staff. The subsequent written emails exchanged between Mark Burke and the judiciary, as well as the letters involving Mark Burke and Richard Woods, have raised serious concerns about whether Plaintiff can receive a fair tribunal and impartial Judge in this, or any proceeding before Harris County District Courts.

The process of obtaining the video footage should have been a simple request, but instead has been intentionally delayed.  It seems that the delay is a deliberate attempt to impede Mark Burke’s discovery efforts in his current litigation, which have consistently faced obstruction from the judiciary without proper legal authority, as documented.

It is not lost on Plaintiff that Woods Offices are an integral part of the Administrative Offices who are responsible for “The Fiasco”.

Glaring Conflict of Interest as Judge Reeder Orders Unlawful Quashing of Plaintiff’s Subpoena of Key Witness, Court Reporter Norma Thieme

In a case marred by controversy, Court Reporter Norma Thieme, a crucial witness to the ex parte communications, found herself at the center of a grave conflict of interest.

Shockingly, the Harris County District Court and Attorney’s Office joined forces in an illicit move to rally around Thieme, aiming to unlawfully quash the Plaintiff’s subpoena.

See; “Here’s Why Harris County Attorney’s Office Cannot Represent the Privately Paid Court Reporter” – KingwoodDr.com; “Plaintiff’s Response to Non-Party Norma Thieme’s Objection to Subpoena, ECT”, Image No. 108169087, Mar. 8, 2023.

This blatant collusion occurred under the order of Judge Lauren Reeder, exacerbating her own conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the questionable actions of the Harris County Governmental and Judicial entities raise serious concerns about the integrity of these legal proceedings.

Court Reporter Norma Thieme, a witness to the ex parte communications, assumed a crucial role in the case. Mark Burke subpoenaed Thieme as an adverse witness for the scheduled sanctions hearing on March 20, 2023, as confirmed by the cloned docket and an email communication thread.

Surprisingly, Harris County Attorneys intervened by filing a Motion to Quash the subpoena on Thieme’s behalf, despite the matter at hand being a private transaction. This interference disregarded established legal authorities and case law, such as Granite Shoals v. Winder, 280 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. App. 2009), which suggests that utilizing one’s position beyond the scope of authority constitutes bad faith.

The Plaintiff raised objections, highlighting the glaring conflict of interest where the very judge complained of by the Plaintiff was presiding over the hearing.  Supporting documents, including “Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Non-Party Norma Thieme’s Objection to Subpoena, Etc.” (Image No. 108169054, March 3, 2023), “Notice of Submission of Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Non-Party Norma Thieme’s Objection to Subpoena, ECT” (Image No. 108169056, March 3, 2023), and “Plaintiff’s Response to Non-Party Norma Thieme’s Objection to Subpoena ECT” (Image No. 108169087, March 8, 2023), clearly explained how Harris County’s representation of Thieme undermined established authorities and case law, which supported Plaintiff’s contentions.

Despite these compelling facts, Judge Reeder, seemingly motivated by self-preservation from potentially damaging testimony, including her own actions following the January 9, 2023 hearing, granted the Motion to Quash, effectively preventing Thieme’s testimony. The judge’s overreach by granting the Motion to Quash the subpoena, has effectively silenced a key witness, undermined the Plaintiff’s rights and impeded the pursuit of justice. This blatant disregard for due process and the suppression of critical evidence highlights a deeply concerning erosion of fairness in the legal system in Harris County District Courts, especially in light of the Assigned Judges own recusal in an equally similar situation as discussed herein.

Baseless Accusations and Perjury Allegations Emerged as Serpe Andrews Associate Attorney Madison Addicks’ Parents Retained New Austin Counsel

The parents of Serpe Andrews Associate Attorney Madison Addicks have been represented by Serpe Andrews since they filed their baseless Counterclaim. See; “HCA Healthcare Kingwood and HCA Houston Lawyers Harassment and Rambo Litigation Challenged” – KingwoodDr.com; “Plaintiff’s Reply To HCA Houston Healthcare Kingwood’s Response To Plaintiff’s Plea In Abatement”, Dec. 20,2022.

Later, Mark Burke sought to subpoena Madison Addicks’ parents as adverse witnesses due to their spectacular absence at the January 9, 2023 hearing. The motive behind this request was to understand, on a non-frivolous basis and under the penalty of perjury in a court of law, under what premise these two active Texas lawyers and parents alleged Mark Burke was involved in [criminal] stalking and harassment.

Shockingly, Addicks father went as far as threatening the process server, prompting Serpe Andrews to accept service on his behalf. However, the parents and/or Serpe Andrews subsequently sought new counsel from Austin, seemingly to file a baseless and potentially sanctionable response.

Curiously, Mark Burke and the parents have never met, nor had any communication via phone calls, emails, or even sightings from a distance. Mark Burke aimed to uncover the truth behind these perplexing accusations and shed light on why these alleged co-conspirators, who are Texas lawyers themselves, would knowingly commit perjury while causing irreparable harm to Mark Burke.

The applicable legal principle in Texas is an actionable civil conspiracy occurs when two or more individuals combine to achieve an unlawful purpose or accomplish a lawful purpose through unlawful means (In re Thoma, 873 S.W.2d 477, 490, Tex.Rev.Trib. 1994; Massey v. Armco Steel Company, 652 S.W.2d 932, 934, Tex. 1983).

Mark Burke plans to pursue this conspiracy and malicious targeting by Defendants, designed to injure Plaintiff.

Judge Reeder’s Bias Evident in Orders Contradicting Her Own Oath, and Commitment to Fairness and Impartiality

Relatedly, Judge Lauren Reeder’s bias in the case becomes unmistakably clear through orders that not only contradict her own oath and ethics but also raise concerns about her impartiality. The Plaintiff filed a motion to extend the discovery deadline, citing the court’s scheduling of the sanctions hearing one business day past the allowed time under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) for an “expert report.” However, on March 15 16, 2023, Judge Reeder issued two orders that shed light on her partiality.

The first order, titled “ORD SGN GRNTNG PROTECTION FROM DISCOVERY REQUEST” (Image No. 108169263), scandalously quashed the subpoena of Court Reporter Norma Thieme.

The second order, labeled “ORD SGND DENYING EXTENDING DISCOVERY DEADLINE” (Image No. 108169259), outright denied the Plaintiff’s request to extend the discovery period by a mere one business day.

These orders, coupled with supporting documents in the petition (pages 5-6), provide compelling evidence of Judge Reeder’s bias, casting insurmountable doubt on her commitment to upholding  the rule of law,  consideration of her own ethical standards and fostering an impartial legal environment.

Judge Reeder’s Court Backdating Docket Entries is a Serious Matter

The situation involving Judge Reeder’s court backdating docket entries is a matter of significant importance. It has come to light that certain orders were only added to the docket on March 16, 2023, as outlined in the provided petition (pages 5-6).

Compare Court 234’s use of the original docket date-stamping for the “Proposed” Orders filed by Defendants as applied to the two Orders denying extending discovery and quashing Thieme’s subpoena, to the “Proposed Order submitted by Defendants the day after the Jan. 9, 2023, hearing, and which would be signed on the same day, the 10^th. However, the date-stamp on the final signed Order is not the 10^th   – the “Proposed Order” date – but rather the 11^th of Jan., 2023, the actual date it would be docketed.

This proves by the preponderance of the evidence, the allegations presented by Plaintiff that the Orders were intentionally modified and back-dated at such a time-sensitive timeline.

For a comprehensive understanding of the issue, it is recommended one review the Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder and the accompanying Verification, which refers to the Public Reprimand of Hon. Denise V. Pratt by the State’s Commission on Judicial Conduct.

This reprimand, which the Commission found to be substantially true and based on the preponderance of evidence, described similar backdating allegations as raised here, against Judge Pratt. It was alleged that she backdated orders to create the appearance of issuing rulings earlier than she actually did, with the assistance of court staff who manipulated the date stamp on the documents. They then initialed and filed these backdated orders, despite knowing that Judge Pratt had not signed them on the claimed dates.

The Commission described similar backdating allegations as those raised against Judge Reeder in this case, but the Commission is not yet involved in this matter.

In the context of the PIA request outlined earlier, which was intercepted by the Administrative Office of the District Courts, Mark Burke’s reply to Staff Attorney Eileen Gaffney included a video link included in an article on LawsInTexas.com (“LIT”).

The article and video provided visual proof of an out-of-state Judge and his staff, officers of the court, altering court documents in a similar fashion to Judge Reeder and/or her staff. The article, titled “Black Robes: Dark Secrets, Cover Ups and Corruption. Reuters Joins LIT in Lighting Up the State of the Judiciary (Hat Tip)” (Jul. 28, 2020), was obtained by Reuters and republished on LIT.

It reported that the Chief Justice accused Judge DeLapp of gross neglect of duty, oppression in office, and complete disregard for the law, declaring him unfit for office. As the video commentary concludes, it confirms that Judge DeLapp resigned and agreed not to seek judicial office again.

However, Richard Woods as District Courts Administrator for Harris County has made it patently clear in his communications that he believes the Texas Judiciary operates on secrecy, ochlocracy and lawlessness rather than transparency, open courts, and a lifelong dedication to follow the rule of law.

Returning to the facts in Plaintiff’s case, in order to meet the deadline of March 17th for the formal disqualification of Judge Reeder, swift action had to be taken by Mark Burke, who asserts that this backdating of documents was a deliberate and premeditated action by the court.

Mark Burke, having personally witnessed a series of incidents, including backdating Orders, and his e-filing notices being turned off by the court, as well as harboring additional concerns, filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder along with a Verified Declaration, as detailed in the provided petition (page 7); “Disqualifying the Court” – KingwoodDr.com.

“The Fiasco” is Completely Blanked by Assigned Judge Dan Hinde

The subsequent judicial and administrative assignments, collectively referred to as “The Fiasco,” necessitate a comprehensive explanation, as elaborated upon in this motion.

The Assigned Judge explicitly acknowledges the evidence presented in the Petition. However, he disregards any content regarding the reasons why this severed case should not be dismissed based on the reasoning in his Order. The Assigned Judges’ justification for dismissal rests on his assertion of claimed “exercise of judicial immunity” and relies upon a non-existent motion, the Motion to Dismiss. It is important to note that such a motion does not exist and could not exist in this context as the Defendants have not appeared, as stated in the Order, let alone filed a document.

This court’s disingenuous finding contradicts the actual record and undermines the integrity of the decision, see Petition, pages 7-10, page 29, and pages 35-41.

The Severed Civil Action is a Nullity

Centering on an erroneous interpretation of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, which was filed a month later on Apr. 17, 2023 and which added Judge Lauren Reeder and ‘administrative’ Judge Susan Brown as Defendants, the court asserted it could usurp its own authority to  sever the two named Defendants into this separate action, 2022-68307-A, improvidently relying on Sec. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 30.017, which has been effective since 9/1/1999.

Judge Shopping; Defendant Hon. Susan Brown Allowed to Hand-Pick the Judge, Former Court 269 Harris County District Judge Dan Hinde

After an erroneous interpretation of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, the judiciary proceeded with “The Fiasco” and subsequently decided to sever Hon. Lauren Reeder and Hon. Susan Brown into a separate civil action. The Defendant, Judge Susan Brown, self-appointed Hon. Dan Hinde, former Judge of Court 269. Clearly, that cannot stand in Texas law, and she should have asked another Judge to assign a Judge to the severed civil case.  See; In re Amos, 397 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tex. App. 2013);

“It would defeat the purpose of the “refer rule” to permit the challenged judge to insert herself in her official capacity as judge in order to exert pressure upon and influence the assigned judge’s judgment. It is not just inappropriate but blatantly improper for a challenged judge to take action designed to influence the outcome of the matter at issue. To hold otherwise would seriously compromise the independence of the assigned judge and undermine the integrity of the judicial recusal process.”.

The cited authority’s principle applies to the case here. However, despite the mounting judicial misconduct, these named actors have plundered forward.

Upon further investigation by the Plaintiff, it has been discovered that Judge Hinde was previously subject to a ‘recusal’ as a sitting judge in a case with similarities to the present proceeding. The case, styled as 201435653 – HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS vs. ADAMS, MAXINE (Court 157), indicates that Judge Hinde agreed to sign an Order recusing himself and transferring the case to Court 157 from 269. This raises the question of what extrajudicial circumstances led Judge Hinde to recuse himself, particularly in response to a motion from a pro se litigant.

One just needs to read the motion from Adams to find the answer, in part;

“Recusal is appropriate on the grounds that Judge Hinde’s a personal bias, relationship with his court reporter appears to have clouded his ability to follow the basic fundamental rules of law with reckless abandonment.”,

and;

“Judge Hinde is the lone judiciary who stands by the belief that presiding over a case involving staff is appropriate. It is the general perception of the public that a bias can be perceived when a judge is presiding over a case involving a colleague.”

Let that sink in for a moment.  Judge Hinde recused and transferred the case to Court 157. However, Judge Reeder refused to [self] recuse and/or disqualify herself on similar grounds. Yet, Judge Hinde defends her by acting as her judicial gatekeeper and counsel in these proceedings.

The Bemusing “Show Cause” Order

Immediately upon assignment of this severed civil action, the Assigned Judge Dan Hinde proceeded to issue a ‘Show Cause’ Order, despite lacking jurisdiction to do so, and for alternate reasons provided in this motion.

Uncovering the Truth: Omitted Transfer of Vital Judicial Orders Raises Concerns

The Order transferring key judicial “recusal” Orders was issued by the Assigned Judge; however, these “recusal” Orders are absent from the live severed docket, raising further concerns of judicial malfeasance and manipulation of court dockets. The assigned judge compiled a detailed list of documents to be transferred from the main docket to the severed docket. However, as revealed, the most critical orders from this supposed “transfer” would never make it onto the live docket.

Plaintiff’s Notices and Request Tells a Captivating Tale the Court Doesn’t Want to Hear

Prior to the Friday, Jun 30 hearing, Mark Burke submitted several notices and one request to the Assigned Judge, who has been acting as gatekeeper and counsel for the judicial Defendants since appointment, and contrary to the law.

These notices, namely “Reservation of Rights and Statement by mark Burke Asserting this Seved [sic] Civil Action is Void for Want of Jurisdiction”, Image No. 108836560, Jun 23, 2023; “Notice RE Proposed Motion to Transfer and Consolidate with Reservation of Rights”, Image No. 108885110, Jun 27, 2023; “Mark Burke (Plaintiff) Notice of Motion to Transfer and Consolidate”, Image No. 108908499, Jun 28, 2023, attaching copy of “Defendant Mark Burke’s Motion to Transfer and Consolidate Civil Action 2022-68307 and 2022-68307A”, Image No. 108908501 and “Proposed Order”, Image No. 108908502 and “Request to Confer with Defendants re Motion to Transfer”, Image No. 108942015, Jun 29, 2023 and finally “Judicial Notice”, Image No. 108950102, attaching “Exhibit A”, Image No. 108950103 (S. Carolina unpub. Case, In the Matter of Lauren Martel) would be docketed, and subsequently acknowledged and accepted by the Assigned Judge in his void June 30 Order. Thereafter, they were forgotten.

Invalidating the Court’s Order: Plaintiff Exposes Serious Deficiencies in Arbitrary and Capricious Judicial Decision-Making

The order issued by the court, as highlighted by the Plaintiff’s arguments, is rendered invalid due to serious deficiencies in arbitrary and capricious judicial decision-making. These deficiencies undermine the legitimacy of the order and warrant its invalidation.

The Plaintiff has exposed the arbitrary and capricious nature of the court’s decision-making process. The term “arbitrary” refers to actions taken without a reasonable basis or lacking in logic, while “capricious” signifies decisions made impulsively or unpredictably.

In this case, the court’s actions demonstrate a disregard for the presented arguments and a failure to adhere to a fair and reasoned approach. Such arbitrary and capricious decision-making compromises the integrity of the court’s order and erodes trust in the judicial process.

See; Int’l Ass’n of Drilling Contractors v. Orion Drilling Co., 512 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tex. App. 2016);

“A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary and capricious. In re Bailey–Newell, 439 S.W.3d at 431. A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is; thus, if the ruling interprets or applies the law incorrectly, a party is entitled to relief under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”

The Plaintiff’s arguments shed light on the inconsistencies and lack of sound judgment that underlie the court’s ruling.

By uncovering these serious deficiencies, Plaintiff has successfully invalidated the court’s Order and conclusory reasoning for its decision. It is evident the decision-making process failed to meet or apply the standards of fairness, reason, and impartiality and as such, Plaintiff’s motion should be GRANTED.

ANALYSIS, ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

The Hearing and Order Issued on Friday, June 30, 2023

Mark Burke (“Plaintiff”) reviewed the docket for the above case on Friday evening and there is an 8-page, image scanned document, labeled DISMISSED ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION, PLAINTIFF COSTS.

First, Plaintiff provides a concise summary of the void ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE by the Assigned Judge.

The Assigned Judge starts by questioning whether Mark Burke complied with Sec. 30.017.

Next, he confirms Mark Burke is not contesting a hearing was reset for Jun 30, 2023 and hence notice of the show cause hearing has been provided.

Also, he half-heartedly admits that Mark Burke provided his reservation of rights, and without confirming this in written form, that Plaintiff unambiguously stated in his notices to the court that he would not be attending the hearing.

Instead, the Assigned Judge confirms that neither Plaintiff nor the two judicial Defendants appeared, either in person or by way of counsel.

The Assigned Judge provides a very scant “Litigation History”, which Plaintiff asserts is not a “history” of the proceedings at all.

In his historical summary, the Assigned Judge categorizes the same into; (a) Providing the relevant section of Sec. 30.017; (b) Audaciously admitted Judge Susan Brown, who is the Presiding Judge of the Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas and a named judicial Defendant, assigned the severed case to him, yet no Order is present on the transferred docket providing confirmation of his appointment, allegedly on the 2^nd of May, 2023; (c) provides confirmation that a cloned docket would be created and highlights the Second Amended Petition as naming the two judicial Defendants, and finally; (d) Confirms the Show Cause Hearing and reasons for the same.

Thereupon, the Assigned Judge addresses ‘Jurisdiction’, and wherein he claims he has jurisdiction to hear the case, with a narrowed view of the severed docket and without any case citations to support his conclusory determination that he has jurisdiction.

After asserting Jurisdiction, he addresses the merits and why this hearing was held. Namely, he reviews two key parts from Sec. 30.017.

Quickly, the Assigned Judge concludes that Mark Burke’s oath is deficient, and that Plaintiff’s claims are based solely on the rulings in a pending case.

As a result, the non-existent Defendants “Motion to Dismiss” is granted, and the case is dismissed with prejudice, and costs borne by Plaintiff.

There’s No Defendant’s and No Personal or Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Defendant’s

It begs the question, where is the Defendant’s motion?  There is none on the docket, and Plaintiff has never seen or received one – as they have not appeared. This is admitted in the document labeled DISMISSED ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION, PLAINTIFF COSTS on the court docket.

In comparison, Plaintiff cites HOPE v. COX, Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-01308-R (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2005). In that 30.017 proceeding, the federal court summarizes;

“Venue was transferred from Travis County, Texas to Dallas County, Texas, on March 23, 2004, whereupon Defendant Judge Joseph Cox (“Judge Cox” or “Defendant”) became presiding Judge. Plaintiff subsequently amended her petition, naming Judge Cox as an additional defendant. Pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 30.017, Judge Cox severed the suit against him into a new action and removed the severed claim to this court on June 28, 2005.” (emphasis added);

“Defendant [Judge Cox] moves to dismiss the claims against him pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 30.017(c). Defendant argues that absolute judicial immunity prevents Plaintiff from stating a claim under which relief can be granted, and that her claims should be dismissed because they were not made under oath, are based solely on Defendant’s rulings, and are not pled properly. See Defendant’s Motion at 1-2. Because this Court finds that Defendant enjoys absolute judicial immunity, the motion is GRANTED.

Judge Cox was represented by Hon. Robert Earl Henneke, Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF), a non-profit organization which focuses on politically conservative interests, and has received support from high-profile, billionaire donors whose intentions may be regarded as questionable. Hon. Henneke is still working for TPPF today.

Here, the actual document itself is labeled ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE (“Order”). The preamble by Hon. Dan  Hinde, (“Assigned Judge”) states the hearing was set for 11.00 am and a recess of 15 minutes taken as nobody appeared, neither Plaintiff nor Defendants, nor anyone professing to represent any party. At 11.16 am the hearing ‘resumed’. No end time is specified. At some point during the same day, this document was signed and uploaded to the docket. No copy was e-served nor emailed to Plaintiff by the court.

The Order is void as; (a) there is no Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as the live docket suggests, and; (b) the court lacks jurisdiction. See; In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 415 S.W.3d 522, 530 (Tex. App. 2013) (“We hold that the trial court’s …order is void for lack of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction.”); In re Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379-80 (Tex. 2022); State v. Gault, No. 01-22-00157-CR, at *16 (Tex. App. Oct. 4, 2022).

The Void Order is an Act of Judicial Impropriety Itself

Considering the short time from hearing to publishing this written manifesto, it appears the Order has been pre-written and/or without care to either the law, or the facts clearly contained in the ‘transferred files’ on the docket. The docket was cloned at the formal request of the Assigned Judge.

See; docket entry labeled “Signed Order”, May 15, 2023, Image No. 108169280. This is admitted and acknowledged on page 3 of the Order.

‘Curiously’, the only document materially referred to by the Assigned Judge from this lengthy list of transferred documents in the Order is Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition (Apr. 17, 2023).

Most ‘striking’ is the fact there’s not a single authority or case citation in support of the 8-page Order’s baseless legal assertions.

See; Lopez v. Star Vascular, LLC, No. 04-17-00550-CV, at *1 (Tex. App. Jan. 18, 2018) (Striking brief, because failure to cite legal authority or to provide substantive analysis of the legal issues presented results in waiver);

Vincent v. West Texas State Univ, 895 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. App. 1995) (“the point lacks case citation and substantive development. That alone provides ample basis to reject it.”);

Ex parte D.K., No. 02-22-00020-CV, at *5 (Tex. App. Oct. 27, 2022) (“ … and cites no relevant case law.”).

Sec. 30.017 Past Cases in Texas Courts

Notably, Plaintiff located only 3 appellate cases in Texas which refer to Sec. 30.017 and one removed  federal case Order as detailed above (Hope).

One of those appellate cases provides a meaningful lower court docket, namely Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203 (Tex. App. 2018) and which supports Mark Burke’s arguments and disposes of the Assigned Judge’s contrived application of Texas law.

In that Fort Bend case, the main civil action would be severed on January 19, 2016 into a separate civil action, CASE NO. 15-DCV-223241A and ultimately dismissed without prejudice to refiling on December 11, 2020, nearly 4 years later (“DWOP’d”). The reasoning for the severance is provided in the appellate courts summary in Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 214 (Tex. App. 2018).

The record clearly shows, the Judicial Defendant and trial judge on the main civil action CASE NO. 15-DCV-223241, now the subject of the separated case, Hon. Brady Elliott, made an appearance on Sep. 7, 2016 to quash a subpoena via appointed counsel (Index #30) and file a motion to stay (Index #32). However, absent from this severed case docket is any formal request or issuance of a citation, or appearance by counsel for the Judicial Defendant. A review of the main docket lists the trial judge as a Defendant as a member of the Juvenile Board, but no citation was issued, or service executed, and no record of counsel appearing is present either.

Sec. 30.017 Does Not Apply to 2022-68307

Similarly, in the main civil action here, 2022-68307, Mark Burke filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Reeder, which was erroneously treated as a Motion to Recuse, and for the reasons provided on the docket and in past pleadings by Plaintiff, the court completely lost jurisdiction but has continued to proceed with the case, including void Orders.

Despite this, the Order discussed in this proceeding narrows the scope of the ‘Show Cause’ hearing to two key issues, the Sec. 30.017(a)(1)’s Oath requirement and Sec. 30.017(a)(2)’s judicial immunity driven clause.

Mark Burke asserts, the Assigned Judge’s reasoning in his Order dismissing the case with prejudice is void, not voidable. See; Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. 1997) (“When a timely filed objection to a visiting judge is improperly overruled, the judge’s subsequent orders are void”).

As explained, Judge Reeder’s failure to disqualify on Plaintiff’s motion, ended jurisdiction of the acts thereafter. But even allowing the referral to Judge Susan Brown, she too was automatically disqualified per the one strike rule. Absurdly, Judge Susan Brown would allegedly  assign the Assigned Judge in this severed civil action, a case involving herself as a Defendant. It is preposterous and correctly asserted by the Plaintiff as a fiasco which makes a mockery of the relevant rules and laws.

The Severed Civil Action is Void

Mark Burke did not attend the hearing. He advised the court in writing that he would not be attending the hearing as the severed civil action is a nullity and as such any judgments or rulings would be void. The court had prior notice. Thus, the June 30 Order described is void.  See; Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. 1997) (“In sum, Dunn’s objection was timely; thus, Respondent’s show cause order signed after the objection was void.”).

See; “Reservation of Rights and Statement by mark Burke Asserting this Seved [sic] Civil Action is Void for Want of Jurisdiction”, Image No. 108836560, Jun 23, 2023.

The Defendants

First, even setting aside the Severed Civil Action is void and addressing the merits of the Order, the Assigned Judge dismissed the case, despite all the admitted notices  Mark Burke docketed with the court.

See; “Notice RE Proposed Motion to Transfer and Consolidate with Reservation of Rights”, Image No. 108885110, Jun 27, 2023; “Mark Burke (Plaintiff) Notice of Motion to Transfer and Consolidate”, Image No. 108908499, Jun 28, 2023 (with copies of Motion and Proposed Order as filed on the docket); Request to Confer with Defendants re Motion to Transfer and …, Image No. 108942015, Jun 29, 2023; Judicial Notice, Image No. 108950102 with Exhibit A Image No. 108950103, Jun 30, 2023.

It is clear and obvious the court was on notice that Mark Burke intended to confer with Defendants. In response, the court suggests that Defendants had no obligation to appear as no citation had been issued, no service effected in this severed action or in the main civil action, 2022-68307. Indeed, the Assigned Judge claims at pages 4/5 to have “scoured the court files” in both civil actions.

Yet, the court relies upon Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition (“Petition”) to assert its authority and evidence. However, a review of the Petition quite clearly shows in the “Parties” section of the Petition that no service is required when an appearance has been made, and both Judge’s Reeder and Brown made an appearance in the underlying case, 2022-68307-A, Apr. 17, 2023, Image No. 108169168, p.2., Plaintiff & Counter-Defendant’s Second Amended Petition.

Second, as discussed in Roach, it appears that the Judicial Officer in that proceeding appeared with counsel, without issuance of a citation or service being executed.

Third, and most importantly, the Show Cause hearing was premature. It is axiomatic that a court cannot render a judgment, especially one dismissing the case with prejudice, when all parties to the proceedings are not properly before the court. This renders the judgment void. See; Murchison v. White, 54 Tex. 78, No. 912, at *81 (Tex. Oct. 19, 1880);

“A void act is one entirely null within itself, not binding on either party, and which is not susceptible of ratification or confirmation. Its nullity cannot be waived.”

See also; E. L. Witt Sons v. Stith, 212 S.W. 673, 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) , explaining the court has no jurisdiction to hold a hearing, absent all the parties;

“Upon the filing of such controverting plea the judge or the justice of the peace shall note on same a time for a hearing on the plea of privilege; provided, however, that the hearing thereon shall not be had until a copy of such controverting plea, including a copy of such notation thereon, shall have been served on each defendant, or his attorney, for at least ten full days exclusive of the day of service and day of hearing.””.

DWOP

The correct procedure for due process and notice to apply would have been to follow local rule 3.6 (Dismissal Dockets), thus noticing and allowing Plaintiff to serve the Officers of the Court if they refuse to waive the same or make a voluntary appearance, as it appears in Roach. A dismissal based on this correct legal form would be dismissal without prejudice to refiling (“DWOP”).  See; Woods v. Schoenhofen, 302 S.W.3d 576, 577 (Tex. App. 2009);

“Court records indicate that this case is eligible for dismissal for want of prosecution because service of citation has not been obtained. The case will be DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION, unless one of the following actions is taken within 45 days of this notice:

1. Service by citation is obtained.
2. A waiver of citation/service is filed; or
3. A verified motion to retain is filed.

(Capitalization in original). There is no record indication that Woods exercised one of the options the notice offered for avoiding dismissal.”

In Woods, the trial court’s action in dismissing the case for want of prosecution without a hearing was an abuse of discretion apparent from the face of the record. The same applies here. Whilst there was a notice and a hearing which Plaintiff acknowledged, the notice did not mention deficiencies or dismissals pertaining to service. That type of restricted notice and hearing without jurisdiction over all the parties cannot stand in law. Indeed, it applies the same common sense reasoning for the matter central to this motion, namely misinterpreting a Motion to Disqualify as a Motion to Recuse also cannot stand in law, and as detailed herein.

“Must Be Made Under Oath”

In the alternative, the Assigned Judge attacks the Plaintiff’s reliance on his “oath”. It should be recorded, this was also raised and discussed in Mark Burke’s notice submitted to the court on Jun 23, 2023 and present on the docket.

“I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”

The Assigned Judge, without any reference to published or even unpublished case law, makes a sweeping statement that this “oath” is deficient, relying upon the erroneous view that Mark Burke did not state the county and furthermore, provide his date of birth.

On the contrary, Mark Burke clearly provided and named Harris County in his Petition. He also provided the last 3 digits of his Driver’s License and Social Security number, which is more than suffice, in law.

Furthermore, the necessary requirement to satisfy an oath is limited to the “under penalty of perjury” clause, which is present in Plaintiff’s ‘oath’;

See; ACI Design Build Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App. 2020); McMahan v. Izen, No. 01-20-00233-CV, at *15-17 (Tex. App. Sep. 2, 2021);

“The McMahans, however, fail to recognize that section 132.001 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code permits a party to use an unsworn declaration in lieu of an affidavit “required by statute or required by a rule, order, or requirement adopted as provided by law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &REM. CODE § 132.001(a).

Section 132.001 defines when an unsworn declaration cannot be used. The statute provides that it “does not apply to a lien required to be filed with a county clerk, an instrument concerning real or personal property required to be filed with a county clerk, or an oath of office or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than a notary public.” Id. § 132.001(b).

But section 132.001 does not exclude its application to an affidavit required by Rule 185. See id. We have previously recognized that “[t]he inclusion of the phrase ‘under penalty of perjury’ is the key to allowing an unsworn declaration to replace an affidavit.””.

Similarly, and as admitted by the Assigned Judge, Plaintiff’s Sec. 132.001 declaration can be used in this instance, however, his conclusory argument without supporting authorities that it is deficient is rejected by actual cited case law. See; In re Whitfield, No. 03-21-00170-CR, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2021);

“The term “sworn” in Rule 4.6 includes the use of an unsworn declaration made under penalty of perjury. (comment to 2018 change to add Rule 4.6; citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 132.001).”

“Whitfield’s notice of appeal does not, however, include the phrase “under penalty of perjury.” See Bahm v. State, 219 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex. 2007) (explaining that “the only phrase that the Legislature actually mandates should be included in such declarations [under Section 132.001] is ‘under penalty of perjury'”).”

As outlined below, Judge Lauren Reeder’s Order denying “Recusal” makes the “oath” requirement moot. Any objections were waived when she signed her void Order, which did not specify any reasons why she declined to voluntarily recuse, including any objections to form of the ‘oath’ being deficient.

Mr. Burke Did Not File a Notarized Affidavit or Verification Supporting Any of the Facts Alleged in the Second Amended Petition

The above heading is an extract taken from Assigned Judge Dan Hinde’s Order and requires an individualized response. As already stated, Mark Burke’s Sec. 132.001 verification is more than sufficient.

Judge Dan Hinde’s Order is an Absurdity and is Now Permanently in the Public Domain, Unless it is Unlawfully Sealed or Vanishes from the Docket

The interpretation and application of Sec. 30.017 in the Assigned Judge’s Order would render any severed action unconstitutional and violate the Due Process Clause.

When a civil action is severed, it becomes a new separate case with its own number and filing fee, and it must follow the standard procedures and rules as prescribed by Texas law.

In such instances, the standard procedure entails submitting an Original Petition along with any accompanying materials such as Affidavits, Declarations, Verifications, Exhibits, and so on, as separate attachments while e-filing. Subsequently, citations are requested to serve Defendants who do not waive service.

It is important to note that according to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (“TRCP”), a party may freely file an amended pleading outside seven days of the trial date without seeking leave from the court (Harper v. Credito Real Bus. Capital, No. 04-21-00212-CV, at *5 (Tex. App. July 20, 2022)). However, the Assigned Judge appears to be implementing a new and absurd legal system, one which discards normal procedures and allows for a hearing with only the Plaintiff invited but which should include the Defendants. By doing so, the Assigned Judge is assigning himself the role of both gatekeeper and counsel for Defendants.

Moreover, in these proceedings and even if the Defendants have not been served, the Assigned Judge can grant a non-existent Motion to Dismiss, resulting in the case being ended with prejudice and costs taxed to the Plaintiff.

In One’s Judicial Haste to Dismiss, the Order Mutes Common Sense

In the Assigned Judge’s interpretation, Sec. 30.017 does not permit the Plaintiff to file an Original or Amended Petition with or without separate supporting materials such as Affidavits, Declarations, Verifications, Exhibits, and similar documents.

Common sense says that cannot stand and unsurprisingly both the law and available authorities do not support his absurd legal application of Texas laws. See; Creekside Rural Invs. v. Hicks, 644 S.W.3d 896, 900 (Tex. App. 2022);

“Appellants did not refile the petition against Judge Armstrong under the new cause number, and instead continued their attempts to file their petition under the original matter. The clerk did not issue a citation for Judge Armstrong.”

Judicially Endorsed Notary Fraud is Rife in Texas, Particularly in Harris County District Courts

Judicially endorsed Notary fraud is a significant issue in Texas, especially within the Harris County District Courts. However, setting that aside for a moment, it is important to note all Harris County District Courts, including the Assigned Judge in this case, Dan Hinde, are aware of Mark Burke’s ownership and operation of a non-profit entity called Blogger Inc. This entity wholly owns a series of branded domains, which are developed and published as legal and investigative blogs. One of these blogs, LawsInTexas.com (‘LIT’), mentions the Assigned Judge as the predecessor to the current sitting Judge Cory Sepolio in Court 269.

In recent times, LIT has undertaken investigations into Harris County District Court cases, revealing a troubling trend of fraudulent “notarized” affidavits, verifications, and declarations.

Despite being aware of instances where attorneys, parties, and licensed Texas notaries have been involved in the signing of fake and fraudulent affidavits, the Court’s reliance on these documents without challenging their authenticity remains a valid and ongoing concern.

For illustrative and evidential purposes, let’s examine two specific individuals, namely Robert C. Vilt (“Vilt”) and James Minerve (“Minerve”), who identify themselves as ‘foreclosure defense lawyers.’ They serve as examples of widespread notary fraud as published in articles on LIT.

See; “Lawyer Clay Vilt’s Harris County Court Foreclosure Affidavit for Eddie Lindsey is Perjurious by Non-Disclosure” published on LIT, and supported by Texas Lawyer James E. Cuellar’s Verified Motion for Sanctions with Exhibits, including Exhibit 4, and which details at least 20 civil actions where Vilt has perpetrated fraud on the court and most, if not all of those cases are also published on LIT. See Civil Action; 202254765 – LINDSEY, EDDIE C vs. WBL SPO I LLC (Court 152).

See also Lawyer James Minerve; “Ben Jones (Deceased) or Mercedes Witt-Jones or Twin Peak Investments v Wilmington FSB”, a published article on LIT and where Minerve employs the services of licensed Texas Notary, Kevin L. Bierwirth, deemed a Vexatious Litigant by Texas Courts, guilty of driving without a license and barely scraped past an enhanced charge of DUI which would have been a felony; Bierwirth v. State, No. 03-17-00314-CR (Tex. App. Feb. 13, 2019), who purportedly notarizes document(s) in the presence of Ben Jones, apparently after a temporary reincarnation, (as officially he’s a dead man); See Civil Action; 202278619 – JONES, BENJAMIN CALVIN vs. CLICK N CLOSE INC (F/K/A MID AMERICA MORTGAGE INC) (Court 157) ; and where LIT has sought comment on LIT’s published article for a related case from the lawyers involved, which is met with obligatory silence, see; “Francisco Sandra Lima or Sandra Lima Candia or Twin Peak Investments and Bandit Lawyer Minerve v NewRez”. This case would be dismissed without prejudice, granted by assigned Judge Robert Schaffer, Court 152, and who is also assigned to the above Clay Vilt / Eddie Lindsey civil action.

LIT published a recent appellate opinion for a case which was on appeal by Vilt; “Thievin’ Houston Lawyer Clay Vilt Caught Scammin’ $21K in Excess Funds from Decedent’s Estate. Bandit Texas Lawyer Robert C. Vilt was sanctioned for the amount he tried to steal. That’s a small price to pay to stay outta jail.”, referencing Vilt v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., No. 11-21-00112-CV (Tex. App. Feb. 16, 2023). Notably, this case did not originate in Harris County, as LIT contends you would never see a similar appellate opinion or decision against Vilt if brought before this County’s District, Appellate Courts or even Federal Court in Rusk St., Houston.

In a recent development, Glenn Beck, an American conservative political commentator, radio host, and television producer, featured Home Title Lock on his show (otherwise known as a paid advertorial). During the recorded interview, Home Title Lock shed light on the ease of obtaining a “notary stamp” from Texas, even for non-residents of the state. Disturbingly, this opens the door for criminals or those with criminal intent to engage in Title Deed Fraud, allowing them to steal real property in Texas for just a few dollars. This revelation prompted the publication of an article titled “Indicted Texas AG Goes After Home Title Lock for Revealing Truth About Title Fraud in Texas” on LIT, highlighting the serious implications of this issue.

In summation, one cannot apply laws to litigants which officers of the courts do not follow themselves, as that would be absurd. Taking account of the facts stated above, Mark Burke’s ‘oath’ is proper and valid.

See; Rocor Intl. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253, 274 (Tex. 2002) (“Well over one hundred years ago, this Court recognized the long-standing rule: “It is the duty of a court to administer the law as it is written, and not to make the law.” Turner v. Cross, 18 S.W. 578, 579 (Tex. 1892).”); Maud v. Terrell, 109 Tex. 97, 100 (Tex. 1918) (“It is the duty of courts to see that the Constitution is observed in the enactment of laws, and to fearlessly declare a law void which violates the Constitution.”). As witnessed and recited by Plaintiff above, applying laws in prejudice against pro se litigants’ but not lawyers, is an unconstitutional act.

Jurisdiction

Once again, disregarding the fact this severed case lacks jurisdiction, the Assigned Judge asserts that the court does have jurisdiction over the proceedings and questions the Plaintiff’s ‘curious’ arguments.

It is a well-established principle that the court determines jurisdiction, not the parties involved, and it serves as the initial step before addressing the merits of any civil action brought before a court of law. As stated in the case Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex.1993), subject-matter jurisdiction is crucial for a court to have the authority to decide a case and is never assumed.

However, in this instance, the Assigned Judge arrives at an incorrect conclusion due to a narrow interpretation of both civil proceedings and the [Second Amended] Petition.

The Plaintiff’s Petition, specifically the section on ‘Jurisdiction and Venue’ spanning from pages 2 to 11, extensively and clearly discusses the reasons why, in the Plaintiff’s view at the time of filing the Petition, the court had jurisdiction. It was only after the Petition was filed and subsequent actions performed by the judiciary, which rendered it void, that the situation changed.

The first of such actions took place only two days later, on April 19, 2023, with the signing of an order denying the disqualification of the judge. Unfortunately, the Assigned Judge’s void Order fails to acknowledge, let alone consider the cloned docket entries which were transferred into this civil action both prior to and after the Second Amended Petition. This omission is perplexing because it overlooks the very reason behind the court’s decision to sever the proceedings, which was based on Mark Burke’s formal request to disqualify Judge Reeder and the subsequent administrative and procedural chaos that ensued. Regrettably, these crucial aspects have been completely disregarded.

While the judiciary may prefer to avoid shedding light on this matter during hearings, writings, or Orders, the court has no discretion in this regard. Therefore, the Assigned Judge’s limited perspective – without authorities – is untenable, violates constitutional principles, and ultimately renders the Order void ab initio.

Furthermore, it is important to note that key documents and orders pertaining to the described ‘fiasco’ are conspicuously absent from the ‘cloned’ docket entries. This further undermines the Assigned Judge’s perspective and reinforces the need to address the full context of the case.

Email is Filed When Transmitted to Officer of the Court’s Email(s)

Relatedly, the Judicial Notice filed on the morning of the hearing citing to a South Carolina Opinion (unpub.), issued two days earlier on June 28, 2023, similarly addresses many of the mistakes witnessed by Mark Burke in the underlying administrative actions and judicial Orders in this Texas proceeding.

For example, In re Martel, No. 2023-UP-254, at *2 (S.C. Ct. App. June 28, 2023) (“ the family court instructed her to “file something. We want it in writing.” The following day-January 11-Martel emailed the scheduling clerk-copying the family court judge, Father’s counsel, and others – and identified several issues she believed necessitated the second judge’s recusal as well. ”).

This email notice was sufficient in law and relied upon by the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, where they summarize, in part;

“We will not detail all of the concerns here, but the email included an allegation that the second judge “appears to be practicing law in this case rather than presiding over this serious matter in [an] unbiased manner””.

This statement applies to all Judges assigned to Plaintiff’s proceedings, including this Assigned Judge.

In conclusion, the South Carolina appellate court reversed the biased family Judge’s ruling.

The same is not true in Texas.

The Actual Recorded Events Post Motion to Disqualify Judge Reeder (“The Fiasco”)

The events require a brief summary and timeline for the purposes of clarity.

In the main case, 2022-68307, Mark Burke filed his Motion to Disqualify assigned District Judge Lauren Reeder on March 17, 2023.

On March 20, 2023, Judge Reeder erroneously signed an ORDER DENYING RECUSAL.

See also; “Judge Lauren Reeder Ain’t a Fan of Volunteering When it Pertains to Following Due Process” – KingwoodDr.com.

On March 24, 2023 at 3.23 pm, Melissa Love, Operations Coordinator for Civil and Family District Courts EMAILED Plaintiff assigning Judge Susan Brown to the “Recusal” Hearing.

On March 30, 2023 Plaintiff responded in the same electronic manner to which notice of the assignment and hearing was provided by the court(s), by EMAILING Melissa Love a letter, timely recusing assigned Judge Susan Brown, which is mandatory, in Texas law.

On Apr. 4, Judge Susan Brown, despite her decades of legal and judicial experience, signed her void ORDER SIGNED DECLINING RECUSAL OF JUDGE, and REFERRAL TO SUPREME COURT ORDER GRANTED.

It should be noted that this Order, “ORDER ON MOTION TO RECUSE AND TO REFER TO CHIEF JUSTICE” is filed onto the docket in the main case, but is not present on cloned docket in the severed case. As shown later, it was included in the list of files to be transferred by Order of this court.

Mark Burke invoked Sec. 74.053 (Plaintiff’s timely objection automatically disqualified the assigned judge), and not Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 18(a). The Order and actions thereafter are a nullity and void.

On Apr. 6, and by void Order, Chief Justice Nathan Hecht of the Texas Supreme Court assigned Judge Robert H. Trapp, Conroe. (Not recorded on cloned docket or main docket).

See; “Texas Courts Don’t Know Their Own Laws Pertaining to Disqualification of Judges”; “Judge Robert H. Trapp Improvidently Assigned by Chief Justice Nathan Hecht” – KingwoodDr.com.

On Apr. 10, 2023 Judge Robert H. Trapp, as erroneously selected by Chief Justice Nathan Hecht of the Texas Supreme Court, signed a void ORDER SIGNED DENYING RECUSAL OF JUDGE [SUSAN BROWN].

Judge Trapp also boasts a fulsome history of legal and judicial experience, yet the legal basis for his Order was also comedic, as it also applied the wrong laws. (Citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 18(a)). This Order is void.

See; In re Union Pacific Resources Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (“addressing the mandatory disqualification of assigned judges under TEX. GOV’T CODE § 74.053(d)). This makes sense, because any orders or judgments rendered by a judge who is constitutionally disqualified are void and without effect.”).

On Apr. 10, 2023 the docket shows Plaintiff’s letter in Response “Re: Order Denying Motion to Recuse signed by Presiding Judge Trapp – 2022-68307- Mark Burke Vs. KPH Consolidated, Inc., ET AL”.

On Apr. 11, 2023, the docket shows Plaintiff’s letter; “Re: “Order on Recusal (Objection) to Presiding Judge” Signed by Susan Brown – 2022-68307 Mark Burke vs KPH Consolidated, ET AL”.

On Apr. 19, 2023, disqualified Judge Susan Brown takes a second bite of the apple denied her and signs another void “Order”, ‘curiously’ now relabeled on the cloned docket as, “Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder and Verified Declaration”.

This document blanks Judge Reeder’s “Recusal” Order. There is no corrective Order on file. The document is labeled; ORDER SIGNED DENYING DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE [LAUREN REEDER]. The image scanned Order states, in relevant part;

“On Apr. 19, 2023, the Court heard the Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder and Verified Declaration TEX. R. CIV. P. 18(a).”

Prior to the aforementioned hearing, Mark Burke communicated to Melissa Love via email that he would not be attending this hearing for reasons stated, namely Judge Susan Brown lacks any and all jurisdiction to proceed with any hearings or issue any Orders as she is disqualified.

It does not go unnoticed that those emails from Melissa Love refer to the “Reset Recusal Hearing”

…and not “Disqualification” hearing as the void Order itself suggests.

On May 15, 2023, Image No. 108169280, labeled ‘Signed Order’, includes a list of docket entries to be transferred, and which should be available on the cloned docket in the severed case, signed by the Assigned Judge. As stated, material Orders and documents are missing from this docket.

All the Acts and Orders of Judges Reeder, Brown, and Trapp were Erroneously Based on Recusal Laws, Rules and Statutes

It is quite simple to summarize The Fiasco. Mark Burke’s Motion to Disqualify and Verified Declaration still stands. All acts, as described by these 3 judges are void from the moment they miscategorized the motion. In turn, Hon. Dan Hinde’s hearing and Order is also a nullity and void.

The Seven Day Rule, Sec. 74.053

Again, setting aside for the moment that all judges Orders are void ab initio, despite Plaintiff’s timely email dated March 30, 2023 requesting mandatory disqualification of Judge Susan Brown, it would be claimed to be untimely.  See; Rubin v. Hoffman, 843 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. App. 1992); In re Caddell, 649 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. App. 2022);

“(c) An objection under this section [74.053] must be filed not later than the seventh day after the date the party receives actual notice of the assignment or before the date the first hearing or trial , including pretrial hearings, commences, whichever date occurs earlier. The presiding judge may extend the time to file an objection under this section on written motion by a party who demonstrates good cause.”).

The Plaintiff’s response was within the time allowed, and this was the first such objection by Plaintiff. See Id.;

“(b) If a party to a civil case files a timely objection to the assignment, the judge shall not hear the case. Except as provided by Subsection (d), each party to the case is only entitled to one objection under this section for that case.”

On April 11, 2023 Mark Burke submitted a letter to Rebecca Brite, Exec. Asst, Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, copying relevant officers of the court. The content of this letter is key to the reasoning by Mark Burke as to why the current severed case and the main case are both proceeding while lacking any jurisdiction to do so, and why any and all hearings, orders, and proceedings are void, in law.

Plaintiff Responded to Court Emails Providing Assignments and/or Hearings and Hence Notice Was Timely

As Plaintiff asserts in his docketed answers, he was provided notices via email only by the administrative courts in relation to assignment and the scheduled hearing pertaining to the motion to disqualify Judge Reeder and Plaintiff timely responded via email to the author of such email(s).

Due to the lack of case law relevant to this type of scenario, it can be viewed as a ‘matter of first impression’. As such, when the South Carolina case was released only a couple of days earlier, Plaintiff noted it is very similar to Plaintiff’s case in Texas, and in particular when reviewing whether an email can be construed as ‘filing something’. The answer is a resounding yes.

Even Circling Back to Sec. 74.053 to Apply the Seven Day Rule is Contrary to the Law

The Judges, after finally admitting to the error in their “recusal” Orders by referring the matter of Judge Brown’s refusal to “recuse” to the Chief Justice, who erroneously appointed Judge Trapp would then circle back to the actual filing Plaintiff submitted, a mandatory strike, disqualifying Judge Brown. As discussed, they would then conspire to  falsely claim the motion was untimely, relying upon the seven day rule. This cannot stand, in law. See; Gulf Maritime Warehouse v. Towers, 858 S.W.2d 556, 562-63 (Tex. App. 1993);

“Reason is over extended when we require parties to lawsuits to seek a back door, covert, indirect method of determining whether a trial judge is disqualified.

That burden rests more fairly upon those with knowledge of potential impediment.

Again, however, our case involves disqualification. We hold that the ten (10) day requisite under TEX.R.CIV.P. 18a does not apply to disqualification.

We, as members of the judiciary, are charged with a duty to first know what our own interests are, and, second, to avoid the intermingling of those interests in litigation pending before us.

It would be extremely difficult for judges to give a complete and thorough monitoring of cases filed in our respective courts to determine some possible conflict or basis for recusal or disqualification.

It is not burdensome, however, when we become directly confronted with possible conflict as the case proceeds toward its final outcome…

Since we determine and hold Judge Floyd to be disqualified under Article V, § 11 and Rule 18b(1)(b), a discussion of whether recusal was also required is not necessary at this time.

We reverse the judgment entered by Judge Floyd and we remand this case back to the trial court. In so doing we assume that local Presiding Judge Michael Bradford shall request the assignment of a judge to try this matter.”.

Ensuring Legal Equity: Prohibiting the Misapplication of Laws with the Intent to Willfully and Maliciously Injure Plaintiff

The actual facts, pleadings, exhibits, and emails which constitute the current status of this civil action offer clear and convincing evidence. Evidence which contradicts the prior actions of the court and judges. When evaluated under the preponderance of the evidence standard, this irrefutable evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff’s legal argument is true and prevails, undermining the validity of the court’s previous decisions, resulting in the issuance of void Orders.

The court(s) in Harris County acted in haste and error on “Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder and Verified Declaration”, and “Plaintiff’s Verified Declaration in Support of Motion to Disqualify Judge Lauren Reeder” by materially and terminally misstating and mis-categorizing the Motion to Disqualify as a Motion to “Recuse” Judge Lauren Reeder by all administratively assigned Judges involved, and including District Judge Reeder when she signed an order denying “recusal”.

Judges may be removed from a particular case either because they are constitutionally disqualified, TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11, because they are subject to a statutory strike, TEX. GOV’T CODE § 74.053(d), or because they are recused under rules promulgated by this Court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a, 18b; TEX. R. APP. P. 16.

The grounds and procedures for each type of removal are fundamentally different.

In contrast, the erroneous denial of a “Recusal” motion does not void or nullify the presiding judge’s subsequent acts. Whilst a judgment rendered in such circumstances may be reversed on appeal, it is not a fundamental error, and can be waived if not raised by proper motion.

Plaintiff correctly and timely sought to disqualify Judge Reeder applying TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11, and disqualify Judge Susan Brown, as allowed because she is subject to a statutory strike, TEX. GOV’T CODE § 74.053(d), and this was Mark Burke’s first strike request, it was allowed.

In Plaintiff’s case, on timely objection, the disqualification of an assigned judge who is not a retired judge is mandatory under section 74.053(d) of the Texas Government Code and any orders entered by a trial judge in a case in which s/he is disqualified are void.

In short, any and all Orders, mistakes by the court(s) which started when Judge Reeder erroneously issued an Order denying “recusal”, and which led to Judge Susan Brown’s strike and mandatory disqualification. Thereafter, the fiasco ensued in sending the “Recusal” to the Texas Supreme Court, for the Chief Judge Nathan Hecht’s attention and who would assign Judge Trapp from Conroe, who would also misapply the laws and rules, were all missteps that would lead to Orders which are not voidable, but void.

ORAL HEARING AND RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

Plaintiff, Mark Burke, maintains his reservation of rights when submitting this ‘Verified Motion for Reconsideration’, that the severed action is a nullity, and the Show Cause Hearing and Order(s) are void. As such, an Oral Hearing on this motion is not applicable.

However, as recognized by Mark Burke in these void proceedings, the Assigned Judge Dan Hinde is assessing costs to Mark Burke. It is for this reason an objection by way of this motion is filed to preserve his rights to pursue Harris County District Courts independently for violation of his civil, constitutional and consumer rights, including but not limited to challenging attorney-client privileged communications which are not always so privileged care of the crime or fraud exception. See; United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 565 n.7 (1989) (“See Gardner, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A. J. 708, 710-711 (1961); Note, 51 Brooklyn L. Rev. 913, 918-919 (1985)”).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff, Mark Burke, filed a timely and compliant Motion to Disqualify District Judge Lauren Reeder with Verified Declaration in support. Judge Reeder’s own actions confirm she accepted the Motion in its current form, including the form and jurat contained therein as a Verified Declaration.

The judicial act confirming acceptance is when she erroneously signed an Order on March 20, 2023 denying ‘recusal’ and without providing any reasoning behind the denial. But see, Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a, “The judge whose recusal or disqualification is sought should not file a response to the motion.”  However, even if we consider an Order as a form of response, the argument falls short in this case. The judge in question signed an incorrectly categorized Order which completely disregarded and failed to address the Plaintiff’s motion. Consequently, any objections have been waived.

This undermines the credibility of the Assigned Judge’s opinion, which notably lacks any published case citations. It is evident that these two judicial Defendants should not have been severed from the main proceeding.

Furthermore, the Assigned Judge, Dan Hinde, neglected to address the Motion to Disqualify and focused solely on the Second Amended Petition. Despite attempts to omit references to Judge Lauren Reeder and Judge Susan Brown, the Plaintiff’s response reiterates the accurate facts presented in a clear and legible format within the Petition. By providing a detailed and comprehensive account of the events which followed Judge Reeder’s void Order, the Plaintiff enables readers, including subscribers of Mark Burke’s gripe site at KingwoodDr.com and related blogs, to objectively assess the undeniable truth and make informed judgments about the court’s prior actions and the merits of the Plaintiff’s legal argument. In short, Plaintiff’s disclosure promotes transparency, accountability, and the pursuit of justice within the community engaged in reviewing this motion.

The court’s determination of the Verified Motion for Reconsideration in this case carries significant weight in shaping the perceived credibility and integrity of the court. A thorough evaluation and fair consideration of the evidence presented will be pivotal in establishing the court’s commitment to upholding justice and ensuring a just resolution. The court’s careful examination of the unassailable truth and its subsequent ruling will not only impact the immediate parties involved but will also have far-reaching implications for the broader legal community and the public’s confidence in the judicial system.

As such, Mark Burke’s Motion for Reconsideration should be GRANTED.

In turn, this will validate the Plaintiff’s proposed Motion to Transfer Venue and Consolidate the case from Court 234 to Court 189. The Assigned Judge made his thoughts known after acknowledging the Plaintiff’s proposed Motion to Transfer by relying upon Local Rule 3.2.3 -Consolidation, which states;

“A motion to consolidate cases shall be heard in the court where the lowest numbered case is pending. If the motion is granted, the consolidated case will be given the lowest number case and assigned to that court.”

In short, his argument would mandate the reverse of what Plaintiff proposes, namely the Transfer and Consolidate Motion should be heard in Court 234 and not Court 189.

However, this does not account for Local Rule 3.2.5, where Plaintiff sought to confer with Defendant Judge Lauren Reeder in relation to the Motion to Transfer and Consolidate, as recognized by this Court in the Notices and formal Request made, through the Assigned Judge as the gatekeeper, and which were docketed and considered in this matter. Additionally, Chambers v. State, 167 S.W.3d 534, 536 (Tex. App. 2005), supports the transfer of the case from the disqualified district judge’s court to another court.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9th day of July, 2023.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code

Mark Burke, State of Texas / Pro Se