The Williamson County Commissioners Court approved an $83,500 settlement with a man who filed a lawsuit against the county and sheriff’s office emplyees after he spent more than two years in jail.

Rodney Hurdsman, who arrived at the Williamson jail in April 2015, alleged a number of abuses, including that he was denied access to using the postal service for personal and legal correspondence, that he was denied medical treatment and that jail staff led a campaign of retaliation against him when he filed complaints.

The Commissioners Court noted in its meeting Tuesdaythat the county denies all of the allegations, denies contributing to anything alleged and denies liability. The court approved the settlement 5-0.

A spokesperson for the county declined to comment further on the settlement or the lawsuit.

Hurdsman was charged in Williamson County on several charges, including aggravated robbery and burglary of a habitation. He was released in 2017.

He is now incarcerated in a state prison in Abilene after being convicted of theft of property worth $20,000 to $100,000 in Wise County, according to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. He is serving a 75-year sentence and is eligible for parole in August 2021.

Hurdsman’s lawsuit, which was filed in April 2017, alleged that he was not able to send time-sensitive legal material to the Wise County clerk’s office because he was not able to pay for stamps and the jail did not follow through on its obligation to send legal mail regardless of the incarcerated person’s ability to pay.

The lawsuit saysthe Williamson County sheriff’s office investigated the matter and found that Mike Gleason, who oversaw the jail at the time the lawsuit was filed and is named as a defendant, had removed the piece of legal mail from the facility.

Gleason, who is running for sheriff, denied all allegations in the lawsuit during an interview on Sept. 11. Gleason said he only met Hurdsman once and never handled his mail. He said he was named in the lawsuit because it named everyone in the chain of the command at the facility.

The lawsuit also alleged that after filing complaints about the handling of his mail, and about black mold in the showers, Hurdsman was threatened by officers at the jail and then faced retaliation, including physical assault, time spent in isolation and the withholding of emergency and regular medical care.

The suit also alleged that officers at the jail removed all letter writing implements and a Bible from Hurdsman’s cell, preventing him from communicating or practicing his religion.

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, Jeffery Allen Addicks (“Mr. Addicks”) and Sharon Lowman Addicks (“Mrs. Addicks”), non-parties in the above-numbered and entitled cause, and file this Motion to Quash, Motion for Protective Order, and Motion for Discovery Sanctions.

I.                   INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2023, subpoenas were issued to Mr. and Mrs. Addicks.1

The subpoenas request that both individuals appear in Court to provide testimony at a hearing on March 20, 2023, at 2:00 p.m.2

In addition, Plaintiff’s subpoenas request the non-parties to produce for inspection their “EMAILS, PHONE RECORDS RE MARK BURKE, OR TANGIBLE THINGS IN POSSESSION, CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF THAT PERSON, PERTAINING TO MOTION HEARING HELD ON JAN 9, 2022 [sic], IN ABOVE STYLED CASE.”3

1 See Exhibit A & B, attached.

2 Id.

3 Id.

Mr. and Mrs. Addicks move to quash the subpoena and request this Court to enter a Protective Order for three independent reasons.

First, the testimony and information sought by Plaintiff’s subpoenas is not relevant to the sanctions hearing or any other matter before the court.

Second, the subpoenas are unduly burdensome on Mr. and Mrs. Addicks in that they obligate them to undertake the time and expense of searching for responsive documents, if any exist, and appearing to provide testimony which has no probative value.

Third, the documents sought are not only irrelevant, they potentially contain highly personal and private information of Mr. and Mrs. Addicks, as well as possible privileged information of Mr. and Mrs. Addicks’ clients.

Accordingly, Mr. and Mrs. Addicks file this Motion to Quash, Motion for Protective Order, and Motion for Discovery Sanctions.

II.                MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

A subpoena can be challenged by the person being subpoenaed, the parties, or any other person affected by the subpoena.

See Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.6(d)-(f).

A nonparty, who has been subpoenaed, may challenge the subpoena by filing objections or a motion for protection.

Id. at 176.6(d)-(e), 192.6;

In re Diversicare Gen Partner, 41 S.W.3d 788, 794 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2001, orig. proceeding), overruled on other grounds,

In re Arriola 159 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, orig. proceeding).

First, a subpoena may not be used for discovery to an extent, in a manner, or at a time other than as provided by the rules governing discovery.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.3(b).

Under the Texas rules, discovery is limited to matters that are relevant to the pending action.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a);

Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding).

And discovery may not be used as a fishing expedition.

In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 449 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding);

In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding);

In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding);

Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d at 815;

see also, Hughes v. State, No. 01-11-00282, 2012 WL 2923180, (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 12, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.)

(“[A] subpoena duces tecum is not to be used as a discovery weapon, but as an aid to discovery based upon a showing of materiality and relevance.”).

Here, the testimony and documents sought by Plaintiff’s subpoenas are not relevant to any matter before the Court and certainly not Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Sanctions—the hearing to which Mr. and Mrs. Addicks have been subpoenaed.

The only possible connection that Mr. and Mrs. Addicks have to this case is that their daughter, Madison Addicks, is an attorney of record for Defendant HCA Houston Healthcare Kingwood (“HCA”) and Plaintiff has sought to harass her through harassing them.4

Prior to requesting the subpoenas, Plaintiff posted Mr. and Mrs. Addicks’ personal address, images of their home, and professional background information on a “gripe” website he owns and operates regarding this litigation.

However, Mr. and Mrs. Addicks have not appeared in this matter in any capacity, are not parties and have no knowledge of any relevant information.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not and cannot provide any explanation as to how these individuals are connected to this case and, for that reason, Mr. and Mrs. Addicks request this Court quash the subpoenas and issue a protective order.

Second, the party causing a subpoena to issue must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing “undue burden or expense” on the person served.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.7.

And the Court may protect the witness from such undue burden or expense. Id.

If an objection or motion for protection is filed prior to the date of compliance, the witness need not comply with those portions of the subpoena

4 Plaintiff also served wholly inappropriate discovery requests on his opposing counsel, Madison J. Addicks, requesting information on her credentials, her representation of HCA in this matter and her communications regarding him.

unless ordered by the Court.

See id. at 176.5(d)-(e).

The burden of securing a ruling on a non-party’s objections is on the party that issued the subpoena.

Olinger v. Curry, 926 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1996, orig. proceeding).

Because Mr. and Mrs. Addicks’ testimony and records have absolutely no relevance to the hearing for which they have been subpoenaed, the subpoenas necessarily impose undue hardship on Mr. And Mrs. Addicks.

Compliance would require them to appear and inject themselves into litigation in which they have no knowledge or involvement.

Moreover, the subpoenas have already required Mr. and Mrs. Addicks to obtain counsel to defend themselves from Plaintiff’s harassing and abusive behavior.

Accordingly, Mr. and Mrs. Addicks request this Court quash the subpoenas and enter a protective order due to the burdensome nature of the requests and the complete lack of probative value of the testimony and documents sought.

Third, the subpoenas seek private information, including Mr. and Mrs. Addicks’ emails and cell phone records.

It is clear, based on Mr. and Mrs. Addicks’ lack of involvement in this matter, that no probative value exists which could warrant disclosure of this highly personal and private information.

Furthermore, because Mr. and Mrs. Addicks are attorneys themselves, the subpoenas also seek privileged communications with clients, as their personal and professional emails and telephone calls are contained on their cell phones, which would interfere with attorney/client privilege.

Therefore, Mr. and Mrs. Addicks request this Court quash the subpoenas in their entirety and issue a protective order to shield such confidential information from disclosure.

III.             MOTION FOR DISCOVERY SANCTIONS

Discovery sanctions are authorized by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.

A trial court may impose sanctions on any party that abuses the discovery process.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b)(2); see also Bodnow Corp. v. City of Hondo, 721 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. 1986).

Discovery sanctions require the application of a two-part test.

First, a direct relationship must exist between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corporation v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991).

Second, just sanctions must not be excessive. Id.

The decision to impose sanctions is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Bodnow Corp., 721 S.W.2d at 840.

The purpose of sanctions is to secure the parties’ compliance with the rules, punish those that violate the rules, and deter other litigants from violating the rules.

Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992).

Another notable purpose of discovery sanctions is to rectify discovery abuse by compensating the aggrieved party for expenses incurred.

See CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528, 540 (Tex. 2016).

Specifically, if the court finds that a party is abusing the discovery process, the court may impose an appropriate sanction authorized by Rule 215.2(b) (1)-(5), (8), including payment of reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b)(8).

Mr. and Mrs. Addicks contend that discovery sanctions, including reasonable attorney fees, are warranted here based on Plaintiff’s attempt to subpoena their testimony and personal information in a matter in which they are not involved and which appears to be motivated solely by Plaintiff’s desire to harass their daughter.

This Court has the authority and power to punish Plaintiff for such discovery abuse and Mr. and Mrs. Addicks requests that it do so.

IV.             CONCLUSION & PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Mr. and Mrs. Addicks respectfully pray that this Court grant their Motion to Quash, Motion for Protective Order and Motion for Discovery Sanctions as to Plaintiff’s above-referenced subpoenas. Mr. and Mrs. Addicks further pray that the Court grant any such other and further relief to which they may be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

SCOTT DOUGLASS & McCONNICO LLP

303 Colorado, Suite 2400
Austin, Texas 78701-2589
512-495-6300
512-495-6399 Fax

By:      /s/ Cynthia L. Saiter

Cynthia L. Saiter
State Bar No. 00797367
aiter@scottdoug.com

ATTORNEY FOR NON-PARTIES JEFFREY ALLEN ADDICKS AND SHARON LOWMAN ADDICKS

On Friday, March 4, 2023, at 5.06 p.m., Plaintiff received a copy of the above filing pertaining to the served witness subpoenas for Houston-based Jeffery Addicks and Sharon Addicks (“the Addicks”) by their Austin-appointed counsel.

The Plaintiff notes Ms Cynthia “Cindy” Saiter, (“Ms Saiter”) new counsel for the Addicks[1] response seeks to quash the appearance of the Addicks at the March 20 hearing, including providing any and all requested documents and records. She also requests a protective order. This does not end her response. Ms Saiter, for the Addicks finally asks the court for “Discovery Sanctions” against the Plaintiff, which is seeking costs and attorney fees. These baseless and frivolous motion(s) should be DENIED for the reasons provided below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff seeks the Addicks testimony and relevant documents and records to be made available at the upcoming hearing on March 20, 2023, as the Addicks were  “Star Witnesses”[2] regarding an application for Temporary and Permanent Injunctions by HCA Houston Healthcare Kingwood (“HCA”) and Serpe Andrews, PLLC (“HCA Lawyers”) at the January 9, 2023 hearing.

The counterclaim (which remains) and application for injunctive relief (denied) sought to chill Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by maliciously and willfully alleging Plaintiff was guilty of criminal ‘stalking and harassment’ under the Texas Penal Code. HCA and HCA Lawyers alleged Plaintiff  ‘crossed a line’ and specifically included the Addicks in form and substance, requesting injunctive relief.

Here’s pertinent extracts from “Plaintiff’s Reply To HCA Houston Healthcare Kingwood’s Response To Plaintiff’s Plea In Abatement” (with exhibits docketed separately), image no. 105682671, dated Dec. 20, 2023;

“14. Burke’s publications on his website recently crossed a line in a post mentioning an attorney assigned to the matter, Madison Addicks, as well as her parents, who are irrelevant to the matter at hand.”

“Not only did Burke post each of her parent’s resumes, but he also created a video compiled from online images of their house, including their street address.”

“HARASSMENT (Tex. Pen. Code § 42.07)

Harassment

“HCA Kingwood incorporates paragraphs 7-16 as if fully set forth in this section.

Through the use of his website, Burke published, and continues to publish, several statements that meet the threshold of Texas Penal Code Section 42.07(a)(8).

Burke’s sole intent in these posts is to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, and/or torment HCA Kingwood, and its retained counsel. Burke continues to target HCA Kingwood’s retained counsel, and most recently, family members.

These posts, mentioned above, are in no way a matter of public concern.”

“STALKING (Tex. Pen. Code § 42.072)

Stalking

HCA Kingwood incorporates paragraphs 7-18 as if fully set forth in this section.

The statements contained on Burke’s website fall squarely within the statutory definition of stalking under Texas Penal Code Section 42.072.

Specifically, Burke’s recent stalking  of counsel for HCA Kingwood, by posting their profiles, resumes, corporate headshots, prior cases in which they have, or currently are associated, and even a video of an attorney’s parent’s house, clearly rises to the level that would cause a “reasonable person” to feel “harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended.” Tex. Pen. Code § 42.072(3)(D).”

At the request of the court at the January 9 hearing, HCA and HCA Lawyers prepared and submitted a Proposed Order[3] the morning after, which included protection for the Addicks, in relevant part;

“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

Burke is required to delete all published information on his website and/or other online forums, as of the date of this order, mentioning HCA Kingwood or HCA Kingwood’s employees, directors, officers, representatives, current and former attorneys, or retained counsel’s address or the addresses of their family members and images of their homes…

This Order shall be binding on Burke and his employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, and those persons acting in active concert with Burke who received notice of this order by personal service or otherwise. It is further,

ORDERED that this case is set for trial on the merits on the…”

The injunctive relief requested would be denied by court order. See; ORDER SIGNED DENYING TEMPORARY INJUNCTION image no. 105941882, Jan. 10, 2023.

Subsequently, Plaintiff asked the judge for the reasoning behind her decision which garnered no response[4]. Plaintiff timely filed a reminder.[5] Judge Reeder denied the request per ORDER SIGNED DENYING FINDINGS OF FACTS/CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, image no. 106399717, Feb. 6, 2023., despite Plaintiff citing to precedent that he was entitled ‘not to have to guess’ her reasoning.

See, in relevant part; In re A.Z.F., No. 04-20-00553-CV, at *1 (Tex. App. Apr. 6, 2022) (“The record affirmatively demonstrates that appellant was not required to guess the reason for the trial court’s ruling.”).

Plaintiff requested the findings of fact and conclusions of law in anticipation of both the upcoming sanctions hearing, and for reference and/or citation while examining the five witnesses commanded to appear on the stand.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

This response will address the Addicks three main arguments presented to quash the subpoena’s and then address their sanctionable sanctions request.

MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

The Addicks Baseless Argument I: Nothing is Relevant

The Addicks state;

“First, the testimony and information sought by Plaintiff’s subpoenas is not relevant to the sanctions hearing or any other matter before the court.”; “Mr. and Mrs. Addicks have not appeared in this matter in any capacity, are not parties and have no knowledge of any relevant information.”.

A detailed review of the complete response for this baseless argument is exactly the reasoning behind why the Plaintiff sought to subpoena the Addicks, who have been commanded to appear as non-party witnesses. Let’s review the facts.

Taking the Addicks complete response and written statements as true would infer that HCA, HCA Lawyers, including Madison Addicks, (the Addicks daughter and counsel for HCA in these proceedings) have made allegations which were false in their Counterclaim and applications for injunctive relief (denied after the January 9, 2023 hearing).

Namely, the Addicks response unequivocally states they have no knowledge of any relevant information and as such HCA and HCA Lawyers have included them in their malicious counterclaims without their consent or knowledge.

See; Missouri-Kansas-Texas v. Gage, 438 S.W.2d 879, 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (“’Counsel should sign their names to motions and pleadings to make themselves responsible for what is stated in them and so as to leave no doubt as to the parties for whom they appear but signature to pleading is a formal requisite and failure to comply with the requirement is not fatal.’ ”).

Without doubt, this is relevant to Plaintiff’s “First Amended Motion for Sanctions, to Disqualify Serpe Andrews PLLC, Nicole G. Andrews and Madison J. Addicks and Order Release of Video Surveillance Footage to Plaintiff” (with exhibits docketed separately), image no. 105718258, dated Dec. 27, 2022, and the upcoming sanctions hearing scheduled for March 20.

The Addicks Frivolous Argument II:  We Have No Knowledge or Information

Once more, taking the Addicks statements as true, they claim in response to have no knowledge of any relevant information. The Plaintiff contests that argument as most probably insincere. That stated, if they have nothing to do with the egregious claims made by HCA and HCA Lawyers, and have no relevant “information”, documents or records, Plaintiff is entitled to determine the truth or falsity of these arguments.

See; Chicago Fraternal Life Ins. v. Herring, 104 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (“A person is responsible for what he represents to be true whether he knows the same to be false or not.”).

By requesting the witness subpoenas and timely serving the court issued subpoenas to the Addicks well in advance of the hearing, Plaintiff has complied with Texas law in his search for the truth.

See; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 847 (Tex. 1992) (“”[Discovery should provide] the fullest knowledge of the facts and issues prior to trial. . . [T]he ultimate purpose of discovery . . . is to seek the truth. . . .””).

Furthermore, whether or not it is inconvenient, or burdensome is a frivolous legal argument to quash a subpoena;

“Second, the subpoenas are unduly burdensome on Mr. and Mrs. Addicks in that they obligate them to undertake the time and expense of searching for responsive documents, if any exist, and appearing to provide testimony which has no probative value.”

See; In re K & L Auto Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239, 253 (Tex. 2021) (“But a party resisting discovery must do more than “make conclusory allegations that the requested discovery is unduly burdensome.””)

As such, Plaintiff herein continues his request for the Addicks to present any and all the documents, records or tangible things in their control, pertaining specifically to the disputed matters relative to the subpoena.

This should include any conversations between the Addicks and their daughter Madison Addicks (and/or family members, friends and colleagues or associates) or any of opposing counsel at Serpe Andrews, PLLC, (and/or family members, friends and colleagues or associates) by electronic, telephonic or other documented means about Mark Burke and his Gripe Site at KingwoodDr.com relevant to them and to some extent, as identified and discussed in the Addicks statements in their response.

The Addicks “Above the Law” Argument III: We’re Immune

The Addicks;

“Third, the documents sought are not only irrelevant, they potentially contain highly personal and private information of Mr. and Mrs. Addicks, as well as possible privileged information of Mr. and Mrs. Addicks’ clients.”.

Both arguments fail.

See; Lehnhard v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex. 1966)

(“’No pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a court of justice.’ 8 Wigmore 528, Evidence, § 2286.”);

(“As a general rule, every citizen has the testimonial duty to give a court of law the information he has. Wigmore justifies the rule upon the principle that ‘He who will live by society must let society live by him, when it requires to. * * * The pettiness and personality of the individual trial disappear when we reflect that our duty to bear testimony runs not to the parties in that present cause, but to the community at large and forever.’ 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2192, pp. 72, 73.”).

Here, the Addicks contradict their earlier statements, where they forcefully contended in I above;

“Mr. and Mrs. Addicks have not appeared in this matter in any capacity, are not parties and have no knowledge of any relevant information.”.

Further into the response they contend;

“Because Mr. and Mrs. Addicks’ testimony and records have absolutely no relevance to the hearing for which they have been subpoenaed, the subpoenas necessarily impose undue hardship on Mr. And Mrs. Addicks. Compliance would require them to appear and inject themselves into litigation in which they have no knowledge or involvement.”.

If they have no relevant knowledge or involvement, then they should have no relevant information (pertaining to the documents and records requested).

This should end their argument.

Instead, the Addicks continue, presenting baseless arguments they may have information, but that information is highly private, sensitive and may include privileged client information.

So which is it?

Without doubt, these questions need to be answered, and the only legal remedy to do so is by ensuring compliance by the Addicks to adhere to requests made in the legally binding subpoenas.

See; Jamail v. Anchor Mortg. Services, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tex. 1991) (“Rule 166b(2)(d) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: “A party may obtain discovery of the identity and location . . . of any potential party and of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. A person has knowledge of relevant facts when he or she has or may have knowledge of any discoverable matter.” [Emphasis added.]”);

In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 791 (Tex. 2021)

(“Most tellingly, the rules expressly recognize that a person has “knowledge of relevant facts” if he “has or may have knowledge of any discoverable matter,” regardless of whether he has “admissible information or personal knowledge of the facts.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(c).

In light of these rules, USAA’s insistence that a lack of personal knowledge necessarily equates to a lack of relevant knowledge rings hollow.”).

In summary and support of Plaintiff, one only needs to review;

Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1987)

(“While Texas courts have not written on the proof necessary to obtain a Rule 166b-4 protective order, federal courts have dealt with the issue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c).

In United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1978), the court noted that a movant must show “a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped conclusory statements.” 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n. 3 (citations omitted).

Sweeping predictions of injury and “[b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning,” do not justify a protective order.

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3rd Cir. 1986).

Though the Texas and federal rules are not identical, these requirements of a particular, articulated and demonstrable injury, as opposed to conclusory allegations, apply to motions for protective orders under Rule 166b-4.”).

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY SANCTIONS

A Sanctionable Attempt to Claim Attorney Fees

The Addicks;

Mr. and Mrs. Addicks contend that discovery sanctions, including reasonable attorney fees, are warranted here based on Plaintiff’s attempt to subpoena their testimony and personal information in a matter in which they are not involved and which appears to be motivated solely by Plaintiff’s desire to harass their daughter.

This Court has the authority and power to punish Plaintiff for such discovery abuse and Mr. and Mrs. Addicks requests that it do so.

First, the repetitive use of the “harassment” argument is made in bad faith. As discussed, HCA, HCA Lawyers, including the Addicks daughter, Madison Addicks, argument in this regard has already been rejected by this court.

Second, in Texas courts, the general rule is that a non-party witness is not entitled to attorney fees as a sanction and Plaintiff’s response has, in the majority, been discussed when addressing the Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order.

That stated;

“Nonparty discovery allows parties to go straight to the source — requesting the same information from someone with no skin in the game… For a simple request for documents or a deposition (oral or by written questions), only a notice and subpoena under Rule 205 are required.”[6]

In short, the Addicks motion is submitted in bad faith to tack on attorney fees which are not allowed. As the Addicks and selected counsel are all Texas attorneys with valid and active licenses with the State Bar of Texas, they are fully aware this is a frivolous motion willfully and maliciously designed to injure Plaintiff both in the eyes of the court and financially. This is sanctionable professional [mis]conduct and should be expeditiously denied.

CONCLUSION

As stated, the Addicks are both Texas lawyers and represented by a newly appointed Texas lawyer in this matter. The Addicks, through counsel have claimed to have read the pleadings in this matter, which includes “Plaintiff’s Reply To HCA Houston Healthcare Kingwood’s Response To Plaintiff’s Plea In Abatement” (with exhibits docketed separately), image no. 105682671, dated Dec. 20, 2023 and which goes into great depth behavior by HCA and HCA Lawyers, which is mirrored here.

More than anyone, these 3 Texas lawyers, each with decades of legal and trial experience, should recognize a lack of candor, be familiar with and understand the legal definition of perjury when signing baseless and frivolous pleadings.

As a refresher, perjury is the act of deliberately lying or making a false statement under oath or affirmation, in a legal proceeding or official proceeding, such as a court trial, deposition, or hearing. In other words, perjury is committed when someone intentionally provides false information while under oath or affirmation, with the intent to mislead the court or other legal authority. Perjury is considered a serious crime because it undermines the integrity of the legal system.

In conclusion, there is no legal argument by the Addicks which could possibly justify quashing the subpoena and other relief requested, including award of costs and attorney fees as a sanction.

The MOTION to QUASH, the MOTION for PROTECTIVE ORDER and the MOTION for DISCOVERY SANCTIONS by the Addicks should all be DENIED.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 5th day of March, 2023.